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BUILDING FORTRESS INDIA: SHOULD A
FEDERAL LAW BE CREATED TO ADDRESS




Abstract: In the past few years, there has been a substantial surge in the
use of Indian vendors by U.S. businesses for the performance of busi-
ness processes. These types of engagements, referred to as business pro-
cess outsourcing, routinely involve the transfer of sensitive personal data
between U.S. and Indian ªrms. Thus, these types of transfers have
raised concerns over the security of such data. The United States cur-
rently regulates these data transfers by industry sector. This policy con-
trasts sharply with other jurisdictions such as Canada, Japan, and the
European Union where more broadly deªned regulations set principles
for the protection of data generally. This Note will examine whether the
United States should enact broader based legislation in order to regu-
late the growing trend of business process outsourcing to India and pro-
tect sensitive data that gives rise to personal privacy concerns.
A line of neatly dressed workers ªles into the Golden Millennium, a
shimmering glass-and-steel building in central Bangalore. One by one, they
swipe ID cards through a reader, then empty their pockets and bags and
stuff cell phones, PDAs, and even pens and notebooks into lockers as a dour
security guard watches. Staffers ending their shifts, meanwhile, are busy
shredding notes of conversations with customers. At the reception desk, visi-
tors sign a daunting four-page form promising not to divulge anything they
see inside—and even then are only allowed to peer into the workspace
through thick windows.1
                                                                                                                     
* Bryan Bertram is an Executive Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review.
1 Pete Engardio, Fortress India?: Call Centers and Credit-Card Processors Are Tightening Secu-
rity to Ease U.S. and European Fears of Identity Theft, Bus. Wk., Aug. 30, 2004, at 28, 28.
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Introduction
The preceding example illustrates the importance Indian business
places on the security of personal data when maintaining business pro-
cess outsourcing (BPO) relationships.2 This importance seems well-
founded given the recent dramatic growth in the BPO sector of India’s
economy.3 Many businesses already outsource or are considering
outsourcing business functions that handle sensitive data.4 As busi-
nesses continue to cut costs in order to improve their bottom line, they
continue to outsource certain business processes that can be per-
formed more cheaply in countries such as India.5 In the context of
these relationships, privacy of one’s personal information has become
an issue because of the highly sensitive nature of the data that often is
transmitted in overseas BPO relationships.6 As a consequence, the In-
dian government and Indian businesses have taken many steps towards
improving the security of personal data passed in these relationships.7
Despite Indian measures, increasing scrutiny has come to bear on
these relationships by the United States.8 Numerous new legislative
proposals have been introduced at both the state and federal levels.9
This scrutiny and associated legislation can be frustrating to India,
which believes it has made many good faith efforts at improving data
security and perceives concerns in the United States to be largely un-
justiªed.10
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the U.S.-Indian BPO rela-
tionship. This encompasses current U.S. law governing overseas BPO,
its effects on the Indian government’s data privacy regulation, as well as
the reactions of U.S. and Indian ªrms. This Note argues that the
United States and India should both enact laws of general applicability
governing this relationship in order to correct current deªciencies as
well as provide a clear set of standards with which U.S. and Indian
businesses should comply and to which Indian law should conform.
                                                                                                                     
2 See id.
3 See Paul Davies, What’s This India Business? 43–45 (2004).
4 See id.
5 See id. at 21–22.
6 See, e.g., Rahul Sachitanand, Lax Privacy Laws Hit Healthcare BPOs, Econ. Times (Gur-
gaon, India), May 7, 2004, available at Factiva Doc. No. ECTIM00020040506e05700015
(explaining the sensitivity of patient ªles outsourced in healthcare BPO and concerns in
the United States over security of this type of personal information).
7 See IT Industry Irked at TV Exposure, Hindu (Chennai, India), Aug. 18, 2005, at 3.
8 See Safety Matters: Outsourcing to India, Economist, Sept. 4, 2004, at 70, 70.
9 See id.
10 See id.
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Part I of this Note will consider background and history of the United
States-Indian BPO relationship by examining drivers behind the growth
of the overseas BPO market and its effects on both nations. Part II of
this Note will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. law in main-
taining secure BPO transactions between U.S. and Indian ªrms. It will
do so by assessing deªciencies in U.S. law as well as examining Indian
efforts to conform to U.S. standards. This Note will conclude by sum-
marizing the deªciencies that currently exist in the United States-
Indian BPO relationship and proposing that the federal government
adopt a law of general applicability to govern overseas BPO.
I. Background and History
Businesses are increasingly seeking to outsource processes that can
be accomplished more cost-efªciently in overseas locations.11 This type
of outsourcing, known as business process outsourcing, is deªned as a
business engagement that transfers responsibility for ongoing man-
agement and execution of a business activity, process, or functional
area to an external service provider in order to gain efªciencies and
improve performance.12 BPO arrangements are exceedingly complex
because they entail the transfer and execution of one or more com-
plete business processes or entire business functions to an external serv-
ice provider.13
BPO now constitutes an enormous growth area for business and
is the fastest growing segment of outsourcing arrangements.14 Tradi-
tionally, BPO occurred domestically.15 Nevertheless, advances in low-
cost data transmission capability and cheap foreign labor pools have
                                                                                                                     
11 See Davies, supra note 3, at 21–22.
12 Kapil Dev Singh, Understanding the Business of Business Process Outsourcing, in Business
Process Outsourcing: Trends and Insights 56, 57 (ASSOCHAM) (2003). Background
information on the conference where this publication was produced is available at
http://www.assocham.org/bpo/bpo16072003.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
13 See id.
14 See William A. Tanenbaum, Information Technology and Business Process Outsourcing, in
PLI’s Ninth Annual Institute for Intellectual Property Law, 220, 230 (PLI Pats.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-016V, 2003),
available at WL 765 PLI/Pat 221. The term “outsourcing” was coined in 1988, but the phe-
nomenon began as early as the 1950s and 1960s. William L. Deckelman, Jr., Outsourcing: A
Primer, in PLI’s 19th Annual Institute on Computer Law, 435, 439-40 (PLI Pats., Copy-
rights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-004D, 1999),
available at WL 547 PLI/Pat 435.
15 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Offshore Outsourcing of Data Services by Insured
Institutions and Associated Consumer Privacy Risks 6 (2004), available at http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/offshore/offshore_outsourcing_06–04–04.pdf.
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prompted a signiªcant movement of BPO overseas.16 The reasoning
behind this shift is that foreign labor is cheaper than comparable do-
mestic labor and quality levels typically do not decline in such a rela-
tionship.17 Another desirable attribute of overseas BPO is the ability to
realize around-the-clock operations—when the workday ends in the
United States, it is just beginning in India.18 Finally, businesses often
turn to overseas BPO in order to focus efforts on “core” functions
where the ªrm has a competitive advantage while allowing others to
accomplish non-core functions.19 The BPO movement is also self fuel-
ing; as some businesses choose to embrace overseas BPO in order to
realize cost-efªciencies, other ªrms are forced to do the same in order
to remain competitive.20
Two of the major areas of growth in overseas BPO have been the
healthcare and ªnancial services industries.21 In healthcare, the use of
offshore contractors has increased in recent years due to advances in
information technology.22 The movement towards electronic medical
records and processing systems has allowed healthcare providers to shift
certain functions off-site if they can be performed more cost-efªciently
elsewhere.23 This technology now allows services such as technical sup-
port, transcription, collation, billing, insurance claims’ processing, and
x-ray analysis to be sent overseas.24 There are ªfteen to twenty large and
midsize vendors in India that service the healthcare market in both
North America and Europe, employing about 5000 professionals.25
Financial services is another area in which overseas BPO relation-
ships have often been created in order to realize business
                                                                                                                     
16 Id.
17 Davies, supra note 3, at 29–30. In fact, the level of quality in BPO relationships with
India may actually increase in comparison to domestic providers because work associated
with BPO is often held in more high esteem in India than in the United States. See id. at 30.
18 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 8.
19 Davies, supra note 3, at 22–23. Focusing on a ªrm’s core implies efªciency because
it allows a ªrm to invest in its own competitive advantage while allowing third parties to
accomplish other activities that the third party views as its own core. Id.
20 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 8.
21 See Tanenbaum, supra note 14, at 240.
22 Kenneth N. Rashbaum, Offshore Outsourcing of Health Data Services, 16 Health Law.
24, 24 (2004).
23 See id.; Davies, supra note 3, at 21−22.
24 Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 24. For example, recent statistics show radiological
outsourcing increasing by 7% per year with 12% of hospitals currently engaging in such a
practice. Nathaniel H. Hwang, Comment, The Concerns of Electronically Outsourcing Radiologi-
cal Services Overseas, 25 J. Legal Med. 469, 471 (2004).
25 Sachitanand, supra note 6.
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efªciencies.26 For example, Deloitte Consulting, L.L.P. estimates that
ªnancial institutions utilizing overseas BPO relationships achieve an
average cost savings of 39%.27 It is estimated that 25,000 tax returns
were completed by accountants in India in 2002 and that almost four
times that amount were processed in 2003.28
India has been a major recipient of overseas BPO because it pos-
sesses an advantage that most other countries do not: a relatively well
educated workforce.29 Due to the increasing sophistication of the In-
dian workforce, India is no longer just a source for cheap code and
call centers. BPO services offer opportunities for Western companies
to access the skills of Indian accountants, scientists, lawyers, and other
professionals.30 Helping matters further is a favorable tax regime insti-
tuted by the Indian government that catalyzes BPO sector growth.31
This conºuence of advantages has helped the Indian tech sector, of
which BPO is a part, to grow substantially in the past few years with
revenues most recently surpassing the $3 billion mark.32 McKinsey &
Company recently predicted that revenues to Indian service compa-
nies would grow to $142 billion in 2008.33 Further, U.S. businesses are
heavily invested in India as a BPO location; General Electric (GE), for
example, receives claims processing, credit evaluation, accounting,
and other functions for eighty global GE branches from 12,000 em-
ployees in India.34 The Indian BPO sector is one of the highest em-
ployment generators for young Indian graduates and has an annual
growth rate of more than 100%.35
                                                                                                                     
26 See Tanenbaum, supra note 14, at 240.
27 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 7. This report goes on to indicate that
one in four institutions surveyed reported cost savings in excess of 50%. Id.
28 Richard G. Brody et al., Outsourcing Income Tax Returns to India: Legal, Ethical, and Pro-
fessional Issues, 74 CPA J. 12, 12 (Dec. 2004), available at 2004 WLNR 14649302.
29 See Davies, supra note 3, at 30.
30 See Andrew Baxter et al., ‘Epidemic’ Warning on Mobile Viruses, Fin. Times (London),
Feb. 23, 2005, at 2.
31 Davies, supra note 3, at 46. In all reality, favorable tax policies are not directly aimed
at the BPO sector. See id. Nevertheless, tax beneªts aimed at the information technology
(IT) sector of the Indian economy have been extended to encompass overseas BPO based
on a theory referred to as IT enabled services (ITES). Id. Under the ITES tax scheme, if
overseas BPO services are enabled by IT (virtually all are), they qualify as IT services and,
therefore, also qualify for preferential tax treatment. Id.
32 See Tackling an Unseen Enemy, Hindu (Chennai, India), Sept. 27, 2004, at 14.
33 Davies, supra note 3, at 16.
34 E.g., id.
35 IT Sector Highest Employer of Graduates, Statesman (New Dehli, India), Dec. 20, 2005,
available at LexisNexis Academic Doc. No. A20055121936-F7A4-GNW.
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Overseas BPO transactions, of the kind between the United States
and India, invariably implicate concerns over personal privacy.36 Ac-
cording to a survey whose sample included 115 companies in India and
the United States, 82% of the companies in the United States were
concerned about information security practices in India.37 Such con-
cerns seem well justiªed because the two industries experiencing the
most growth in outsourcing are ªnancial services and health care,
which are also two of the largest compilers of personal data.38
Privacy should be distinguished from conªdentiality and trade se-
crets.39 Privacy refers to the use and disclosure of personal information;
it only applies to information speciªc to individuals.40 Different juris-
dictions have often deªned privacy protection in different ways, but
most deªnitions coalesce around a set of certain principles.41 The fun-
damental principles underlying privacy protection are summarized in
the Fair Information Practices deªned by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion: (1) notice; (2) choice; (3) access; (4) security; and (5) enforce-
ment.42 Notice includes both notice that personal information is being
collected as well as notice regarding any disclosure to a third party.43
The “choice” principle refers to the notion that the consumer ought to
retain the ability to opt out from use or disclosure of personal informa-
tion by a third party.44 Security involves protecting personal informa-
tion from unauthorized access or misuse.45 Access involves allowing an
individual whose information has been collected the ability to contact
                                                                                                                     
36 See Francoise Gilbert, Privacy Strategies in Outsourcing, in The Outsourcing Revolu-
tion 2003: Protecting Critical Business Functions 523, 527 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-01E8, 2003), available at
WL 767 PLI/Pat 523. Privacy can often be a loaded term, difªcult to deªne and with many
nuances. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Beneªts and Costs of Online Privacy
Legislation, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 85, 88–94 (2002).
37 Sudha Nagaraj, BPO Fine But What About Data Privacy?, Econ. Times (Gurgaon, In-
dia), Nov. 6, 2004, available at Factiva Doc. No. ECTIM00020041105e0b60004o.
38 See R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA
Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 Vill. L. Rev.
625, 628 (2004).
39 See id.
40 Gilbert, supra note 36, at 528–29.
41 See id. at 529.
42 Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 91–94. European Safe Harbor guidelines for
United States businesses slightly expand upon the FTC deªnition listing onward transfer
and data integrity as additional principles underlying data privacy protection. Compare id.
with Davies, supra note 3, at 39.
43 See Gilbert, supra note 36, at 530.
44 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 91.
45 Gilbert, supra note 36, at 530.
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the collecting entity with inquiries or complaints.46 Security is rather
self-evident from the name; reasonable steps should be taken to protect
the security of personal information collected from individuals.47 Fi-
nally, enforcement entails adequate remedies to cure violations when
they do occur.48
In the most extreme example of a privacy breakdown, a Pakistani
woman working remotely for a medical center in California threatened
to post conªdential patient records on the internet if she was not given
a pay rise.49 Pakistan is certainly not India, but in the perceptions of
many, it was close enough.50 For their part, Indian ªrms argue that
their data security policies are world-class; ICICI OneSource, the
outsourcing arm of India’s largest private sector bank claims its policies
are superior to any in Europe and the United States.51 The lack of high
proªle incidents in BPO relationships supports this claim.52 At ICICI
OneSource, for example, there have only been two incidents of credit-
card abuse, involving the theft of, respectively, $13 and $22.53 Neverthe-
less, when contrasted with a recent FDIC study that lists India amongst
countries with no data protection law, one must wonder whether the
lack of incidents stems from India’s measures or simply derives from a
certain measure of luck.54
II. Discussion
A. U.S. Regulatory Framework Governing Overseas BPO
The United States has so far never adopted legal measures gen-
erally applicable to overseas BPO but rather relies upon narrow
measures aimed at speciªc issues and industry sectors.55 The ap-
proach is very different from other developed nations and organiza-
                                                                                                                     
46 Id.
47 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 93.
48 See id. at 93–94.




53 Id. Heartland Information Services, Inc., a Toledo, Ohio medical outsourcing com-
pany, reported in 2004 an extortion attempt by an Indian worker using personal data.
Chris Seper, Outsourcing Brings Identity-Theft Risk, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), May 24,
2004, at E4. This worker was subsequently arrested within twenty-four hours of the threat.
Id.
54 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 20.
55 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 116.
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tions such as Canada, Japan, and the European Union, which all have
more generalized data privacy laws that incorporate more stringent
requirements.56 The typical justiªcation for the approach taken in the
United States is that enacting more generalized legislation could be
prohibitively costly and lead to unintended consequences.57 Neverthe-
less, it is interesting to note at the outset that the lack of any privacy
legislation of general applicability has prompted the European Union
to deem the United States as lacking adequate privacy protection.58
1. Identity Theft
At a very general level, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deter-
rence Act of 1998 makes identity theft a federal crime and provides an
individual right of action for restitution as well as criminal sanctions.59
The Act was passed in response to the patchwork of laws that previously
addressed identity theft, and it carries strong penalties for violators.60
The Act also cured deªciencies in enforcement of identity theft; the old
patchwork of laws charged several different agencies with enforcement
while the Act vests enforcement responsibility with the FTC.61
2. Health Information
Personal health information is protected by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, commonly referred to as
HIPAA.62 HIPAA was not originally written to protect privacy, rather, it
was meant to facilitate health insurance transferability and the transfer
of private information between entities.63 HIPAA’s privacy regulations
                                                                                                                     
56 See Kenneth A. Adler, Recent Trends in Outsourcing: Understanding and Managing the
Risks, in 24th Annual Institute on Computer Law, 389, 406 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-01K6, 2004), available at
WL 781 PLI/Pat 389.
57 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 158–59.
58 Gilbert, supra note 36, at 559. This label prompted a lengthy negotiation of safe
harbor provisions for U.S. businesses in order to avoid costly impediments to the transfer
of data between the United States and Europe. Id. A U.S. company that adheres to the safe
harbor principles and completes the Department of Commerce’s self-certiªcation pro-
gram will receive a presumption from all E.U. member states that its data privacy protec-
tions are adequate. Id.
59 Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codiªed at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)); see
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 121.
60 McMahon, supra note 38, at 629–31.
61 Id.
62 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codiªed as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); see McMahon, supra note 38, at 645.
63 McMahon, supra note 38, at 644.
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were enacted by the Department of Health and Human Services subse-
quent to the legislation itself.64 HIPAA regulates the outsourcing of
data through the Privacy Rule which was published in December,
2000.65 The Privacy Rule regulates access through an opt-in choice
mechanism to provide privacy for patient information.66 This opt-in
mechanism only allows disclosure of personal information if the patient
expressly authorizes such disclosure.67
Despite restrictions on access, this rule has several enforcement
problems because it has difªculty reaching offshore BPO providers in
countries such as India.68 HIPAA does not directly address the possi-
bility of privacy breakdowns by contractors.69 The Privacy Rule does
recognize that medical providers will inevitably outsource some of
their functions and designates the contractors for such work as Busi-
ness Associates (BAs).70 BAs are subject to the same regulations as the
initial provider because the Privacy Rule requires BAs to enter into
contractual arrangements that conform with the provisions of the Pri-
vacy Rule.71 Problems arise because most medical providers initially
outsource to domestic ªrms that, in turn, will outsource to offshore
ªrms such as those in India.72 Even though those Indian BAs are sub-
ject to the same provisions of the Privacy Rule as everyone else, those
BAs are so attenuated from the original provider that promises may
be hollow at best.73 Exacerbating this difªculty is a lack of offshore
jurisdiction granted to the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) which is charged with enforcing the Privacy Rule.74
Moreover, even though BAs must contract with the provider, the pro-
vider has no obligation to monitor the conduct of any of its BAs.75
                                                                                                                     
64 See id. at 645. The Privacy Rule is codiªed at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006).
65 See Gilbert, supra note 36, at 539.
66 McMahon, supra note 38, at 648.
67 Id.





73 See Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 25.
74 See id.
75 Id. Even if a medical provider does monitor the activities of its business associates,
the great distances involved can often serve to mask privacy problems. Jaikumar Vijayan,
Security Expectations, Response Rise in India: Increasingly Tough Demands from U.S. Clients Spark
Change, Computerworld, Aug. 30, 2004, at 6. For example, a growing BPO ªrm that was
in the process of relocating to a larger facility decided to move some of its servers to an
internet café during a period of delay over the new facility’s opening. Id.
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Finally, HHS is the only entity that may enforce the Privacy Rule.76
The Rule provides no private right of action for health care consum-
ers.77 This deªciency has not gone unnoticed and Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton of New York has introduced a bill which would re-
quire create a private right of action for any misuse of this information
by an offshore concern.78 Some help is also provided by more stringent
state laws that are not preempted by HIPAA, but not every state has
such laws.79
3. Financial Information
Federal regulation of ªnancial services overseas BPO is accom-
plished through a web of federal statutes.80 For example, the Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 places restrictions on credit card
agencies in using personal data, one notable restriction being disclo-
sure only in instances of business need.81 At the center of federal
ªnancial regulation is the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, commonly referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
which provides privacy protection for personal data.82 One of the
strengths of this Act is its scope, covering ªnancial advice, credit coun-
seling, credit cards, data processing, investments, lending check cash-
ing, wire transfers, tax preparation, debt collection, or providing credit,
insurance, lay-a-way, ªnancing, brokerage, ªnancial aid, lease, or ac-
count services.83 The GLBA requires ªnancial institutions to make full
disclosure of their privacy policies to consumers.84 The GLBA further
requires that entities subject to the Act implement substantial security
measures and demands that the agencies that implement the GLBA
                                                                                                                     
76 See Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 25–26
77 See id.
78 Safeguarding Americans From Exporting Identiªcation Data Act (SAFE-ID Act), S.
810, 109th Cong. (2005); Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 27.
79 See Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 26.
80 See id. at 28 (discussing ªnancial data).
81 Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2403, 2413, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-430, 3009-447 (1996)
(codiªed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(a), 1681s-2 (2006)); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36,
at 122.
82 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codiªed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809
(2006)); see Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 123.
83 See Gilbert, supra note 36, at 535. The GLBA derives its sweeping scope from its ap-
plicability to the term “ªnancial institutions” which was not deªned in the Act but has
subsequently been deªned broadly by the FTC. McMahon, supra note 38, at 634–35.
84 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1459, 1479 (2004).
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publish extensive security standards.85 The GLBA requires that any
outsourcing concerns, even if offshore, must be under contractual
agreement to comply with all applicable standards.86 The Federal Bank-
ing Agencies have extended the responsibilities of ªnancial institutions
to also monitor the activities of any third party to which it transfers sen-
sitive data.87 Further, the FTC has indicated its willingness to prosecute
any abuses of personal ªnancial data under the GLBA.88
Unfortunately, the GLBA has many deªciencies.89 Its opt-out
mechanism for limiting access to sensitive data is a point of controversy
for GLBA’s critics.90 Some have argued that few consumers actually ex-
ercise this option because consumers would have to struggle through
ªne print to learn how to protect their privacy.91 More narrowly, con-
sumers do not have the normal opportunity to opt out of a transfer of
their information overseas when the purpose of the transfer is to “serv-
ice or process a ªnancial product that the customer requested or
authorized . . . or maintain or service the customer’s account.”92 This is
signiªcant when it is considered in relation to a recent FDIC report in-
dicating that 15% of the ªnancial services cost current cost base ($356
billion) is expected to move offshore in the next ªve years.93
4. State Regulation
Despite the presence of these federal statutes regulating aspects
of overseas BPO, there remain a myriad of state statutes and common
law also affecting BPO transactions.94 Many states ªrst addressed these
                                                                                                                     
85 Gilbert, supra note 36, at 536.
86 See id.
87 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 14.
88 See Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 28. In a letter to Congressman Edward Markey, FTC
Chairman Timothy Muris wrote, “[s]imply because a company chooses to outsource some
of its data processing to a domestic or offshore provider does not allow that company to
escape liability for any failure to safeguard the information adequately.” Id. Despite the
reassuring tone of its rhetoric, the FTC has not yet brought any actions against an overseas
provider for any breach of conªdential information. Id.
89 See id. The GLBA has many critics who argue that its protections have not provided
any real privacy enhancements. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 130. For example,
according to former Federal Trade Commission chairman Timothy J. Muris, “Acres of
trees died to produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy notices.” Id.
90 See McMahon, supra note 38, at 635–36.
91 See id. at 636.
92 See Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 28 (citing § 502(c) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
15 U.S.C. § 802(e) (2006)).
93 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 15, at 2. The numbers in the FDIC study
were compiled by Deloitte Consulting, LLP. Id.
94 Gilbert, supra note 36, at 534.
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types of privacy issues under a theory of tort, and many still rely on
the common law that developed from such an approach.95 Beyond the
common law, state legislatures have passed numerous statutes address-
ing very narrow privacy concerns.96 Some states have even experi-
mented with broader measures to guard personal privacy.97 For ex-
ample, California recently enacted legislation to compel notiªcation
of individuals when their information has been improperly appropri-
ated by a third party, a requirement that cuts across industry lines.98
In addition to a complex regulatory framework, it is increasingly
obvious that many federal and state efforts to patch privacy holes are
not so much aimed at securing privacy as they are at preventing the
outsourcing of domestic jobs.99 An example of such veiled legislation
lies in a recent bill proposed by Senator George Voinovich of Ohio
that would restrict the outsourcing of work conducted by any compa-
nies with government contracts, a measure that is in no way tied to
privacy concerns.100 An amendment to this bill proposed by Senator
Christopher Dodd would take the provisions one step further to in-
clude state contracts funded with federal money.101 This type of legis-
lation is not limited the federal level; for example, Virginia currently
has four anti-BPO bills pending, and the Secretary of Technology for
Virginia acknowledges that job preservation is a key motivator.102
3. Self-Regulation
Given the lack of a clear regulatory framework or any privacy law
of general applicability, the federal government has also often en-
couraged self-regulation.103 Self-regulation can involve such measures
as companies passing their own data privacy policies.104 Several or-
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ganizations now provide seals of approval for these types of privacy
policies if they meet certain minimum requirements.105 Further, In-
dian businesses have enormous incentive to avoid privacy scandals so
as to avoid the bad publicity associated with a privacy breakdown.106
The Bush Administration favors self-regulation to secure privacy.107
B. The Indian Reaction to U.S. Data Privacy Law
Currently, the only law that speciªcally governs Indian businesses’
protection of personal data derives from foreign jurisdictions such as
U.S. or European Union data privacy laws.108 Nevertheless, Indian
lawmakers have enacted Indian laws that indirectly regulate Internet
commerce.
Indian businesses have typically been very concerned about privacy
concerns and overseas BPO transactions.109 This should not be surpris-
ing given the large contributions of the BPO sector to India’s econ-
omy.110 In order to quell both U.S. political and business concern, India
has enacted several measures to prevent any data privacy abuse.111
1. Information Technology Act of 2000
Most prominent was India’s adoption of the Information Tech-
nology Act of 2000.112 This Act was based on the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations (U.N.) in 1997.113
At a broad level, this legislation was an important step forward be-
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cause it placed India amongst only a few countries that currently regu-
late Internet transactions.114 The opening provisions of the Act read:
An Act to provide legal recognition for transactions carried
out by means of electronic data interchange and other
means of electronic communication, commonly referred to
as “electronic commerce”, which involve the use of alterna-
tives to paper-based methods of communication and storage
. . . .115
Although the Act is not generally applicable to data privacy speciªcally,
it does deªne a certain universe of “electronic” activity for regulation,
and the typical BPO relationship is a subset of this universe.116 Of
speciªc interest to BPO transactions with the United States are Sections
4, 5, 7, and 79 of the Act.117 The aforementioned sections are applica-
ble to overseas BPO because they deªne data, mandate standards for
the authentication and retention of that data, and provide penalties for
violations of these provisions.118 Nevertheless, even though the Act
deªnes data, it is completely silent on the issues of data protection.119
One of the most important aspects of this Act is the creation of a
special appellate court for violations of the Act’s provisions.120 Indian
courts are notorious for being exceedingly slow in their resolution of
disputes.121 As one scholar has noted, “[The Indian legal system] has all
the ºexibility and user-friendliness of a land mine, threatening to blow
up should you or anyone close to it look like moving.”122 Thus, the
creation of an independent appellate branch speciªcally tasked with
overseeing computerized transactions signals a dedication on the part
of the Indian government to ensuring that these transactions are dealt
with expeditiously.123 It is important to note, however, that even crea-
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tion of a special judiciary unit may not completely relieve the problem
of court delays.124 Delays in Indian courts are a function of two prob-
lems: “an insufªciently slow growth in the number of sanctioned posi-
tions, and a growth in the number of unªlled vacancies.”125 While cre-
ating a special judiciary unit might cure the former problem, it does
nothing to address the latter because it provides no guarantee that the
newly created judicial positions will be properly funded and staffed.126
2. Proposed New Privacy Legislation
Despite the progress made with the Information Technology Act
of 2000, India still lacks speciªc law regarding the protection of per-
sonal data in overseas BPO transactions.127 India’s government is cur-
rently working on new legislation to quell growing privacy concerns.128
The government plans to study laws both in the European Union and
the United States to ascertain how to best structure India’s own laws.129
Any proposal ultimately adopted by the Indian parliament will likely
reºect the European Union’s requirements on data privacy which
served as India’s original impetus to review its own laws.130 Neverthe-
less, U.S. business concerns will likely play a role too by inducing India
to refrain from setting standards that are too stringent and costly.131
3. Self-Regulation
Some of India’s efforts at complying with the demands of U.S.
privacy law have originated in the private sector rather than the legal
sector.132 The National Association of Service & Software Companies
(NASSCOM) is India’s national information technology trade group
and has been the driving force behind many private sector efforts to
improve data security.133 According to Sunil Mehta, Vice President of
NASSCOM, “We want to make India kind of a Fort Knox of informa-
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tion of the world.”134 NASSCOM has been one of the contributors to
efforts to tighten the Information Technology Act 2000.135 NASSCOM
also plans to have the security practices of all its members audited by
international accounting ªrms.136 Additionally, NASSCOM directly
contributes to the development of legal enforcement mechanisms.137
For example, in Mumbai (Bombay), a center of Indian commerce,
NASSCOM has taught a dozen police ofªcers the basics in ªghting
cyber-crime.138
Because Indian ªrms have gone to such lengths to protect data
security, a new market, which is ancillary to the BPO market, has
emerged.139 Long Island-based Verint Systems Inc. provides systems
used for video and voice surveillance at a cost of $1000 per worker.140
Indian ªrms also pay up to $300 per worker for background checks
that can take several weeks to compile.141 Cyrca Data Security Solu-
tions, a Toronto-based IT security, privacy and, compliance company,
has also entered the Indian market to provide consultancy services
regarding outsourcing.142
Given the extensive measures that Indian business and govern-
ment have undertaken in order to meet privacy concerns, it seems nei-
ther unnatural nor unfair that they expect a positive perception of In-
dian data security.143 Yet, most of this demand for respect has gone
unrequited in the United States as political ªgures continue to use pri-
vacy as a smokescreen for efforts to curb outsourcing and protect
American jobs.144 Thus, one of the biggest problems in the U.S.-Indian
relationship does not implicate legal or private sector issues but, rather,
perception by India that efforts to meet U.S. demands will be dealt with
fairly.145 U.S. policymakers who advocate restrictions in overseas BPO to
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India often cite both privacy and employment concerns as their motiva-
tions.146 This only serves to hurt efforts at improved data privacy be-
cause India views these concerns more as an excuse to stem job loss
than any real concern over privacy.147 Further, this perception spans
both continents: U.S.-Indian citizens share India’s concerns over anti-
BPO trends.148 Anti-BPO efforts by U.S. policy makers have strained the
U.S.-Indian relationship by creating an Indian perception that privacy
concerns have become the hot new excuses for an age-old movement
to erect barriers to trade and stem the outsourcing of U.S. jobs.149
III. Analysis
The preceding discussion illustrates the narrow, industry approach
of U.S. law to overseas BPO.150 At the most general level, no federal law
deªnes a universal standard for personal privacy.151 Although general-
ized privacy restrictions exist for information policy within the federal
government, Congress has basically defaulted to a market-oriented
model that is supplemented by more narrowly deªned pieces of legisla-
tion.152 Use of self-regulation by business entities then supplements
these protections.153 This contrasts sharply with the more systematic and
wide reaching forms of legislation employed by member nations of the
European Union, as well as Canada and Japan.154
1. Beneªts and Detriments of Sectoral Regulation
The traditional justiªcation for this sectoral approach to privacy
legislation is utilitarian in nature, arguing that broader protections are
not cost-beneªt justiªed.155 This type of utilitarian balancing usually
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favors less restrictive regulation that is narrower in scope.156 Given this
methodology, the current patchwork of sectoral laws is not all that sur-
prising.157
The utilitarian approach to privacy balancing is open to criti-
cism.158 Cost-beneªt analysis often favors the party that can better
quantify the values for its position which, in the context of the privacy
debate, is business seeking less regulation and less cost.159 Further,
some privacy advocates believe that the debate should not be utilitar-
ian at all’ rather, they believe that people have certain rights to privacy
that should be protected without reference to cost.160
The narrowness of U.S. federal privacy policy is particularly evi-
dent when contrasted with the policies of the European Union.161
Countries enjoying membership in the European Union have enacted
laws regulating personal data.162 While each law may contain somewhat
different content, the European Union has harmonized these laws into
a general framework by requiring individual countries to follow guide-
lines set forth in the European Union Directive 95/46/EC on the Pro-
tection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data.163
These guidelines include requirements similar to the previously dis-
cussed principles of notice, security, access, and enforcement.164 The
European Union directive creates a guideline set of protections that
every country must meet.165 Countries are, however, free to institute
more stringent requirements as they see ªt.166
Most notably, the European Union directive creates an omnibus
right of action, whereby data subjects can sue a data collector for mis-
use of data and receive monetary damages with ªnes as high as
$500,000 in some countries.167 “Individuals must be able to enforce
their rights rapidly . . . and without prohibitive cost.”168 Finally, there
must be an institutional mechanism allowing for investigation of com-
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plaints.169 Mandating such a set of legal enforcement mechanisms en-
sures that EU law never encounters a deªciency such as that associated
with HIPAA: lack of a private right of action over a data privacy viola-
tion.170
Nevertheless, generalized legislation such as the European Union
directive is not without its criticisms.171 First, generalized statutory
language always runs the risk of becoming out of date in quickly shift-
ing technological environments.172 Further, legislation proper for one
sector of business may be over- or under-restrictive for another.173
Generalized laws lose the ability of sectoral legislation in their ability
to target speciªc protections to speciªc industries.174 Finally, general-
ized legislation creates certain costs to doing business that could po-
tentially place a country at a disadvantage in the marketplace.175
2. Need for Default Rules
Despite these shortcomings, it would still appear advisable that the
United States adopt some of the philosophies of its European neigh-
bors and implement some form of general applicability law to overseas
BPO in order to govern the U.S.-Indian BPO relationship.176 Establish-
ing a set of principles governing overseas BPO would be beneªcial be-
cause it would set a minimum set of standards for data privacy to which
all BPO relationships would have to conform.177 Model principles of
this sort are readily available in the form of the European model as well
as the previously discussed Fair Information Practices promulgated by
the Federal Trade Commission.178 Finally, it would help to eliminate
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differing protections and deªciencies across sectors.179 For example,
HIPAA has an enforcement deªciency because it does not provide a
private right of action, whereas GLBA, while it does not have a similar
enforcement deªciency, has a choice deªciency because it does not in-
clude an opt-out provision for overseas BPO.180
One of the considerations in drafting such generalized legislation
should be a utilitarian cost-beneªt balancing to create default rules
protective enough to guard data privacy.181 This calculus should not,
however, be so restrictive that it kills the proverbial goose that lays the
golden eggs by exacting such high costs that overseas BPO loses most
of its business efªciencies.182 For example, compliance with HIPAA in
its ªrst year cost an estimated $3 billion. Crafting equally restrictive
provisions across the entire spectrum of overseas BPO would, by ex-
tension, potentially be prohibitively costly.183 Such analysis is impor-
tant because broad-based privacy legislation has often been criticized
on the grounds that it would not be cost justiªed.184 Nevertheless, al-
though it is broader than a sectoral approach to regulating overseas
BPO, a law of general applicability would still be narrow because it
would only apply with a speciªc type of outsourcing transaction, BPO,
and it would only apply to that transaction when it occurs in an over-
seas relationship.185 Thus, cost-beneªt analysis is not completely in-
compatible with a law of general applicability for overseas BPO.186
Of particular importance would be enforcement provisions.187
Creating a general right of action for data privacy violations would
                                                                                                                     
179 See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
180 See McMahon, supra note 38, at 637 (explaining that consumers do not have the
normal opt-out choice associated with the GLBA under instances where information is
shared to perform services for the ªnancial institution); Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 25
(explaining enforcement deªciencies within HIPAA).
181 See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
182 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 158–59 (explaining the dangers of
broadly worded privacy legislation because of the possibility that such legislation could
create prohibitive costs).
183 See McMahon, supra note 38, at 650.
184 See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 158–59.
185 Cf. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 36, at 159 (explaining that privacy legislation
of more narrow concern, focused on particular issues, would be more likely to be cost-
beneªt justiªed).
186 See id.
187 See, e.g., Rashbaum, supra note 22, at 25 (pointing out the lack of a private right of
action in HIPAA which severely weakens enforcement in the healthcare sector).
2006] Building Fortress India 265
cure already existing deªciencies in that regard.188 Further, given the
difªculty in ªnding timely redress in Indian courts, such a provision
would assure that those ªnding their rights violated would always have
some form of expeditious recourse.189
Also worth careful scrutiny are principles detailing notice and
choice.190 Notice is important because it increases consumer knowl-
edge as to what their privacy rights are.191 At the same time, too much
knowledge could be a bad thing in the context of privacy.192 Just to
comply with the GLBA, around 40,000 ªnancial institutions were
compelled to mail 2.5 billion privacy notices between the Act’s im-
plementation and June, 2001.193
Choice should be limited on a careful basis.194 Default rules al-
lowing for opt-out choice mechanisms should be mandated to guaran-
tee privacy because a general rule of opt-in choice would be far too
costly to BPO relationships.195 Such a general rule would not necessar-
ily preclude speciªc government action to protect particularly sensi-
tive data or sectors with opt-in mechanisms; it would only preclude
their costly widespread use.196
Some form of overseas BPO legislation would also signal to India
that U.S. regulation still focuses on privacy issues rather than employ-
ment concerns.197 With a slew of legislative proposals aimed at restrict-
ing overseas BPO, India has, justiªably, become extremely suspicious
that U.S. efforts are not really aimed at privacy but, rather, at jobs.198
These suspicions were only bolstered by much of the anti-outsourcing
of jobs rhetoric during the 2004 presidential election.199 Passing legisla-
tion targeted speciªcally at the principles of privacy protection in over-
seas BPO would help to refocus efforts away from job loss and back on
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privacy.200 In turn, such a refocusing could potentially help improve
India’s conªdence in the sincerity of U.S. motives.201
Finally, beyond a utilitarian perspective, generalized legislation
regarding overseas BPO would help to protect data privacy based on
the notion that individuals have a right to such protection.202 It is easy
to collapse the debate surrounding overseas BPO regulation into a
tidy economic cost-beneªt box because the costs of compliance are
easy to quantify.203 Further, it is often difªcult to quantify the beneªts
of privacy protections because they are not amenable to numerical
valuation.204 Nevertheless, the ease of calculating cost with the
difªculty of calculating beneªt can lead to under-protection if a utili-
tarian philosophy dominates.205 Moreover, a utilitarian approach may
not be reconcilable with certain U.S. legislation either.206 For exam-
ple, the preamble to HIPAA expressly recognizes that medical privacy
is a “fundamental right” different from “ordinary economic
good[s].”207
The central problem with restricting discussion of overseas BPO
regulation to only utilitarian concerns is that such restriction serves to
commodify privacy.208 Yet, most would probably agree that personal
privacy is more than a mere economic good.209 Loss of privacy is seen
as a loss of personal autonomy, an affront to human dignity, or even
an intrusion into one’s core-self.210 This theory would support a gen-
eralized law of overseas BPO to govern relationships such as the U.S.-
Indian BPO relationship because privacy constitutes more than a
mere economic commodity that is not easily valued by utilitarian cost-
beneªt balancing and demands such protections despite high costs.211
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Conclusion
In order to improve the security of personal privacy in the U.S.-
Indian BPO relationship, the United States ought to consider adop-
tion of a general law of applicability, deªning data privacy standards
for these types of relationships. Although there have not yet been any
high-proªle instances of privacy breakdowns in the context of the
U.S.-Indian relationship, deªciencies currently exist in protections
that should be addressed.
In the two primary sectors where overseas BPO relationships oc-
cur, ªnancial services and medical services, deªciencies exist that could
compromise personal privacy. In the ªnancial services sector, primarily
governed by the GLBA, these include the lack of opt-out mechanisms
for overseas BPO. In the medical services sector, lack of an individual
private right of action undermines the principle of enforcement and
furthers the possibility of privacy breakdowns. Although not a complete
list, the deªciencies in these two sectors highlight the primary struc-
tural problem in U.S. regulation. These inadequacies span the major
sectors where overseas BPO occurs, and they vary by sector. Therefore,
the only means of correcting them under the current approach would
be the inefªcient and time-consuming process of crafting narrow legis-
lation to deal with each sector’s own problems.
U.S. policymakers ought to consider creating a law of general ap-
plicability governing oversees BPO transactions in order to rectify
many of these shortcomings and provide a more consistent data pri-
vacy protection policy. Such a law would provide a set of governing
principles applicable to all sectors of overseas BPO and set a ºoor of
protections for data privacy.
Of particular importance for such a policy would be the princi-
ples of enforcement, notice, and choice. Creation of a general right of
action for those harmed by privacy violations would cure any such
deªciencies in sectoral legislation. Emphasizing consumer notice pro-
visions would be a cost-efªcient manner to promote better data pri-
vacy protections. Finally, creating a default opt-out choice mechanism
would ensure that all consumers have the option to refrain from hav-
ing their personal information sent overseas while not creating the
excessive cost burden of an opt-in mechanism. It is important to note
that all of these provisions should be structured as minimum protec-
tions that can be superseded, as need requires, by more traditional
sectoral legislation.
The primary beneªt of such generalized legislation would be a
coherent data privacy framework for overseas BPO relationships. Such
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a framework would ensure a minimum set of protections across secto-
ral lines and eliminate the loopholes that currently exist in the tradi-
tional patchwork of sectoral legislation. Further, such a framework
would serve to clarify U.S. privacy expectations to Indian businesses.
Finally, broad legislation of this sort would still remain cost-beneªt
justiªed because it would remain narrow enough, aimed only at a par-
ticular type of BPO relationship, to avoid traditional cost criticisms of
exceedingly broad privacy legislation.
Finally, generalized overseas BPO legislation should be introduced
because privacy is more than a mere economic commodity and de-
mands more protections than the current utilitarian balancing affords.
Allowing business concerns over cost to dominate discussion of privacy
in the U.S.-Indian BPO relationship skews analysis in favor of business
who can more easily quantify a numerical value for its position. This
ignores important personal value placed on one’s own privacy and
leads to a regime of under-protection. Therefore, in order to protect
privacy in the U.S.-Indian BPO relationship, legislation should establish
a minimum level of protection to ensure that privacy is not com-
modiªed as an economic good and, therefore, is not under-protected
as such a good.
